Archive:The Descendants of John Whitney, page 636
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The Descendants of John Whitney, Who Came from London, England, to Watertown, Massachusetts, in 1635, by Frederick Clifton Pierce (Chicago: 1895)
Transcribed by the Whitney Research Group, 1999.
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| 636 | WHITNEY GENEALOGY. |
process of building when Secretary WHITNEY, assumed office. It was determined at once to ask for appropriations for a large number of vessels and set on foot in ear- nest the task of building up the navy. The appropriations from the previous Repub- lican administration, together with the large amounts received by the new admin- istration were already available. The designs for the new ships were under considera- tion, and with their selection all that remained was the awarding of the contracts to the individual firms. Investigation set on foot by Secretary WHITNEY, however, dis- closed the doleful fact that the steel manufacturers of this country were wholly un- able to cope with the proposed work. Not a single plant existed in the country which could be put in service in turning out material of the kind called for in the specifications. Not only was the United States in March, 1885, "without a vessel of war which could have kept the seas for one week as against any first-rate naval power," but it was dependent upon English manufacturers for the forging of guns, for armor, and even for secondary batteries, resorting in the case of rapid-fire guns to purchases from French manufacturers in the main. At the very outset it became evident that the policy of the government must be outlined, and a decision at once rendered as to whether the navy department should call in foreign shipbuilders to build our new war vessels or place our own manufacturers in a position which would render them capable of doing the work. Secretary WHITNEY early came to the conclusion that the United States ought to be independent of all other countries. He referred to the matter in his report for 1886 as follows: "At the present time, and for many years to come, in the event of a conflict with either a first or a second-class naval power, it would be quite impossible for the United States as at present situated to produce within its territory either the armor required for armored ships or the guns necessary for their armament. Nor would it be possible for the navy of the United States to protect such articles in transit across the ocean in time of war. As at present situated, the country would be entirely defenceless in the absence of any ability to produce armor or the larger high-powered guns. It is a most lamentable circumstance that a country like ours, with its immense products of iron and steel, should be content to be dependent upon the manufacturers of any other nation for the fabrication of armor and high-power guns, both of which are now essential and in indispensable parts of a modern fighting ship. Whatever its commercial policy may be, in the production of its necessary implements of war it should certainly be independent. This policy involves delay in the construction of the first vessels authorized, but at the end of five years the country would, by pursuing it, be independent, and in a much stronger position in every respect than would result from any other course." The policy indicated by the secretary would, if put in operation, involve a delay in the construction of all classes of armored ships of at least three years, but in the face of this policy, says the secretary, "was determined upon without hesitation as the only course consistent with a proper regard for our national pride and dignity." Secretary WHITNEY immediately devolved the efforts of the department to the problem of domesticating in this country the industries for the making of armor and of forging for high-power guns. It became necessary to prepare factories for the construction of steel forgings for the heavier guns, armor for iron-clad ves- sels, and secondary batteries of machine and rapid-fire guns. Just how to go about it was the perplexing problem. The first step taken was the issuance of an order stopping the purchase of all armor and steel abroad. Contracts were pending in March, 1885, for armor and gun steel purchased in England amounting to $227,365.20. The final payments upon these contracts made subsequent to that date amounted to about $100,000 and it is needless to say that no further purchases were made of armor or gun steel abroad after March, 1885. Mr. WHITNEY called in con- ference the representative firms of the country and made known his intention of giving every possible help to the home industry. Contracts were drawn up drawn up for different portions of the work desired and a condition imposed on the bidding calling for the erection of a plant in this country adequate to the manufacture of both armor and gun steel up to the highest standard of European requirements. The experiment consolidated in one advertisement all its requirements for armor and gun steel for the then authorized war ships, stipulating that it should be of do- mestic manufacture and giving an average of two and a half years in which to pro- duce and deliver it, which covered the time necessary for the procurement of a plant. A period of about seven months was allowed for submission of bids, in order to afford an opportunity for full investigation by the expected bidders. Throughout the whole of the seven months every influence which could with consistency be brought to bear was used by Mr. WHITNEY to stir the manufacturers of the country up to a realizing sense of the importance of the endeavors. And when the bids were opened no difficulty was found in making a contract with the Bethlehem Iron Company, under which the erection of a plant was stipulated for the production of armor and
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